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WATER LAW-THE RISE AND FALL OF NEW MEXICO'S
TEMPLETON DOCTRINE*

The interrelationship of surface and ground waters has long been
an axiomatic concept in hydrology.' In 1932 the Supreme Court of
New Mexico legally recognized this fact in El Paso & R. I. Ry. v.
District Court.2 However, notwithstanding this official recognition
of a fact of nature, the public waters of the state of New Mexico at
that time and at present are regulated under two outdated classifications-ground waters 3 and surface waters. The ground-surface distinction, easily defined in theory but often difficult to apply in practice,
has recently presented New Mexico surface-right holders with a
serious problem.
If a surface-right holder owning the right to the use of a certain
amount of public water from a given source is faced with a situation
where there is an inadequate supply of surface water at his point of
diversion, what rights does he possess through his surface water
right by which he may reobtain his proportionate share of the public
waters? The ground-surface classification of waters has long been
an insurmountable obstacle preventing such an owner of a surface
right from tapping an interrelated body of ground water as a means
of replenishing his depleted surface supply.'
In the past two decades this problem has received some recognition from the New Mexico State Engineer. 5 As a result, in certain
*Templeton v. Pecos Valley Artesian Conservancy Dist., 65 N.M.

59, 332 P.2d

465 (1958).
1. See generally Davis, Handbook of Applied Hydraulics (2d ed. 1952); Ackerman & Lof, Technology in American Water Development (1959).
2. 36 N.M. 94, 8 P.2d 1064 (1931).
3. Not all ground waters in New Mexico are public. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-11-1

(Supp. 1965) defines public ground waters as follows:
The water of underground streams, channels, artesian basins, reservoirs, or
lakes, having reasonably ascertainable boundaries, are . . . public waters . . .
and . . . subject to appropriation for beneficial use.

4. In Clark, New Mexico Water Law Since 1955, 2 Natural Resources J. 484
(1962), a short explanation of the problems created by the ground-surface classification is concluded with the following statement:
Adherence to an unscientific and outmoded method of surface-ground
water classification will not aid in the establishment of sound legal measures
for interrelating an increasingly more valuable water supply.
Id. at 539-40. (Emphasis by Professor Clark.)
5. In Spencer v. Bliss, 60 N.M. 16, 25, 287 P.2d 221, 226 (1955), the court noted
that the state engineer had published the following notice at the opening of the Carlsbad Underground Water Basin:
'Carlsbad Basin is presently open to filing of applications for appropriation of underground waters for supplemental use on lands with existing sur-

face right.' [Emphasis the court's.]
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areas of the state, efforts have been made to provide for supplementing surface rights through the granting of ground water appropriations. Unfortunately, the scarcity or non-existence of unappropriated
ground waters in all ground water basins today' has severely limited
the success of these efforts. Until 1958, surface waters generally were
considered as one source of water, while ground waters were held
to be a distinct and separate source. Two unrelated systems of
priority governed these two legally created classifications of water.
A holder of a water right in one system had no rights regarding any
appropriations he might desire to make from an interrelated body
of water classified in the other system. In the past, the ground-surface classification and the legal separation of the corresponding
holders of these water rights proved to be a workable system of
water administration. 7 Within recent years, however, the gradual
diminution of New Mexico's surface water supply, as well as the
continual decrease in the level of its ground waters, has brought the
two classes of right holders into direct conflict on numerous occasions.
In 1958 such a conflict arose in Applications of Langenegger.s In
Langenegger, the owner of certain drainage water rights applied to
change his point of diversion from an inadequate artificial drainage
system to several shallow wells. In the words of the New Mexico
Supreme Court,
[T]he waters it [the drainage system] intercepted and gathered
have been beneficially applied on the farm by applicant and his predecessors. The source of the waters as found by the trial court is
the public undergroundwaters.9

Thus, the applicant was doing nothing more than attempting to use
a different type of diversion as a means of obtaining water from the
valley fill, conceded by the court to be the source of his drainage
waters. The application was denied by the state engineer and again
denied by the supreme court. The court held that because his water
right was applicable only to drainage waters, and because drainage
waters are classified as private waters "as a rule of property,"' 1
6. Discussions with the state engineer reveal that not only are all basins closed to
new appropriators but also that many of the basins are over-appropriated.
7. For a general analysis of the merits of New Mexico water law see Hutchins,
The New Mexico Law of Water Rights (N.M. State Engineer Tech. Rep. No. 4, 1955).
8. 64 N.M. 218, 326 P.2d 1098 (1958).
9. Id. at 220, 326 P.2d at 1099. (Emphasis added.)
10. The fact that drainage waters are private was established in Hagerman Irrigation Co. v. East Grand Plains Drainage Dist., 25 N.M. 649,187 Pac. 555 (1920).
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Langenegger was not entitled to change his point of diversion to a
public water source.
Drainage waters were originally classified as private waters in
New Mexico because they originated from ground waters which
were then considered to be private. When ground waters in New
Mexico were reclassified as public waters," drainage waters retained
their private classification. Thus, the Langenegger case was decided
according to the ground-surface classification of waters. The case
represents a perfect example of a denial of a point of diversion transfer solely on the basis of the classification of the involved waters.
Five months after Langenegger,12 the Supreme Court of New
Mexico took its first step toward discarding the obsolete method of
regulating public waters according to their classification. In 1954,
several parties, including W. H. Templeton, filed applications with
the New Mexico State Engineer to drill wells in the Roswell Artesian
Basin. The applicants were seeking to appropriate the shallow
groundwaters of the basin to supplement their surface rights to Rio
Felix water. The state engineer conducted a hearing and ultimately
denied the applications. On appeal to the District Court of Chaves
County, judgment was entered in favor of the applicants. The district court found that
the granting of applicants' applications will only restore the flow of
water to the amount appropriated, and is in effect a change of place

of diversion; the drilling of such wells, and the use of water therefrom, will not impair existing rights . ... 13
A subsequent appeal by the state engineer to the Supreme Court
of New Mexico resulted in an affirmance of the lower court's decision.
The supreme court found that the Rio Felix surface waters originated in part from the valley fill or ground waters of the Roswell
Shallow Water Basin.' 4 The supreme court held that Templeton was
11. The first declaration of ground waters as being public waters occurred in 1927.
This statute was found to be invalid in Yeo v. Tweedy, 34 N.M. 611, 286 Pac. 970
(1930). In 1931, the predecessor of the current statute, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-11-1
(Supp. 1965), was enacted. See note 3 supra.
12. 64N.M. 218, 326 P.2d 1098 (1958).
13. Templeton v. Pecos Valley Artesian Conservancy Dist., 65 N.M. 59, 63, 332
P.2d 465, 467 (1958).
14. Id. at 67, 332 P.2d at 470. The court said:
The next contention of the appellants is that the proposed change of point of
diversion amounts to a new appropriation in an underground basin that is
fully appropriated. This proposition is based on the assumption that there is
no connection between the surface flow of the Rio Felix and the underground
water basin. The findings of the lower court do not support this assumption.
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entitled to follow his surface right to its source by changing his point
of diversion from a surface appropriation on the Rio Felix to a
ground appropriation in the valley fill. This change in the point of
diversion, which the court found would not impair existing rights, 5
was deemed not to be a new appropriation from the basin, and for
that reason 1 6 the state engineer's denial of the application to drill
the shallow wells was found to be erroneous.
The Templeton decision appeared to represent a long-awaited
breakthrough in New Mexico water law. If surface rights could be
followed to their source by a surface-right holder, then the troublesome ground-surface classification of waters could be eliminated.
Surface and ground waters might come to be treated as one source
and regulated according to an ideal system involving only one set
of priorities.' 7 However, subsequent cases in this area revealed that
such a solution for New Mexico's problems was not at hand, primarily because of problems involving the impairment of existing rights.
In New Mexico, the problem of impairment of existing rights'"
has two distinct branches. First, there is no existing authority defining in exact terms the word "impairment" as used in a legal sense. 9
A party desiring to transfer a point of diversion has no statute and
very little case law on which to rely in determining whether or not
he will impair another right through his transfer. Additionally, those
cases which do offer some assistance are occasionally in conflict. In
In re Hobson,2 ° the New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed decisions
by the state engineer and the district court denying an application
for a transfer on a well from one location to another within the Roswell Ground Water Basin. The court held that impairment would
The lower court found that the headwaters of the Rio Felix sank into the
ground and became a part of the Valley Fill and then rose again into the river
and that the appropriations made by the appellees amounted to appropriations
out of the Valley Fill.
15. Id. at 68, 332 P.2d at 469.
16. Ibid.
17. Even if the priority system were abandoned in New Mexico for a pro rata
system of water allocation, one system taking all waters into account would be far
superior to the present system which involves two sets of priorities.
18. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-11-7 (1953), which governs the transfer of a ground
water point of diversion, says in part:
The owner of a water right may change the location of his well or change
the use of the water, but only upon application to the state engineer and upon
showing that such change or changes will not impair existing rights. . ..
[Emphasis added.]
19. For the New Mexico Supreme Court's position on the problem of impairment,
see note 29 infra and accompanying text.
20. 64 N.M. 462, 330 P.2d 547 (1958).
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take place in the move-to area simply because the waters of the
basin were already over-appropriated and because waters in the
basin did not "fluctuate evenly"'" throughout the basin. The "even
fluctuation" argument was used successfully again by the state engineer in Durand v. Reynolds.2 2 In Durand, the lower court record
indicated that water located at the move-from diversion point did
not flow evenly to the move-to location and thus an impairment of
existing rights would result from the proposed change in location.
The court also held that the transfer to the new location would
result in the impairment of nearby surface rights on the Pecos
River.23 These two potential impairments of existing rights were
found sufficient to sustain denial of the application. On the other
hand, in Application of Brown,2 4 the supreme court found that the
lowering of a ground water basin water table did not constitute impairment per se. The court said:
The lowering of a water table in any particular amount does not
necessarily constitute an impairment of water rights of adjoining appropriators. The amount that the water table is lowered is an important factor, but in addition all characteristics 25of the particular
aquifer must be considered along with well locations.

Some cases offer a strict interpretation of certain types of impairments. Any increase in the salt content of the water in a basin was
found in Heine v. Reynolds2" to be a possible impairment of existing
rights. The supreme court said:
The gradual increase of the salt content of the water in the Basin,
due to increased pumping, could well prove to be disastrous to the
entire Basin, even though the increase
of the salt content attributable
27
to one well would be very small.

In essence, the court in Heine held that any impairment, even though
it might be "very small," was sufficient to prevent the transfer of a
point of diversion.2"
21. Id. at 463, 330 P.2d at 548.
22. 406 P.2d 817 (N.M. 1965).
23. Id. at 819.
24. 65 N.M. 74, 332 P.2d 475 (1958).
25. Id. at 80, 332 P.2d at 479.
26. 69 N.M. 398, 367 P.2d 708 (1962).
27. Id. at 402, 367 P.2d at 710.
28. Heine's entire appeal to the supreme court was based on the contention that
"substantial" impairment was necessary to allow the denial of an application under
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-11-7 (1953).
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The Heine opinion summarized the court's position on what is
and what is not impairment:
We are of the view that the question of impairment of existing rights
is a matter which must generally depend upon each application, and to

attempt to define the same would lead to severe limitations.29

The second branch of the impairment problem is that in cases
involving an application to change a point of diversion the New
Mexico Supreme Court has held that the burden of proof is on the
applicant to show that the change will not impair existing rights.8 0
This burden of proof, coupled with a lack of guidelines regarding
what will or will not be an "impairment," as well as the supreme
court's position that each case will be decided on its own facts, has
had the overall effect of severely limiting point of diversion transfers.
The Templeton doctrine injected a third factor into the impairment problem. For the doctrine to be applied equitably, the priority
system governing one water classification had to be reconciled with
the priority system of the other. In the Templeton case the supreme
court found that existing ground and surface rights would not be
impaired by the transfer."' However, the court completely avoided
any decision regarding the method to be employed in reconciling surface priorities with ground priorities in Templeton transfers.
The 1962 case of City of 41buquerque v. Reynolds3 2 provided an
interpretation of what the Templeton decision held concerning this
vital problem of reconciling surface and ground priorities. District
Judge Reese, writing for the supreme court, said:
[W]e did there hold [in Templeton] that a prior appropriator of
stream water had the right to follow the stream water to its underground source and the right to drill wells and take the underground

water necessary to fill his prior stream right, regardless of detriment
to other underground water appropriators whose rights were subsequent in time to the stream right."8

This interpretation of the Templeton doctrine was obviously a significant factor contributing to the eventual rejection of the doctrine
by the court as an effective rule in New Mexico water law. This in29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

69 N.M. at 402, 367 P.2d at 711.
See Spencer v. Bliss, 60 N.M. 16, 287 P.2d 221 (1955).
65 N.M. at 68, 332 P.2d at 469.
71 N.M. 428, 379 P.2d 73 (1962).
Id. at 438, 379 P.2d at 80.
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terpretation of the doctrine placed surface-right holders in a superior position to existing junior ground-right holders, producing a
result in direct conflict with comparable law regarding ground-toground transfers.3 4 The protection of junior appropriators is commonly recognized as an essential element of the law governing
water right transfers. However, instead of curing this minor defect
in the Templeton doctrine, the supreme court apparently has decided
to overrule the entire doctrine.
The first steps toward eliminating the Templeton doctrine were
taken in two recent water transfer decisions. The 1964 case of
Reynolds v. Wiggins3 involved an application to inject drainage
water into an underground basin, and then to pump an equal amount
of water out at the point of injection at a later date. The application
was denied by the state engineer but was subsequently granted on
appeal to the district court and affirmed by the supreme court. The
supreme court found that the state engineer had based his decision
on an error of law in finding that the Wiggins transfer would "impair existing rights." 6 The fact that Wiggins argued his case on the
basis of a new appropriation, which would not impair existing
rights, 37 and not on the basis of a surface-to-ground transfer, provided the court with the steppingstone needed to return to the strict
ground-surface classification of waters. This steppingstone was used
in the 1965 case of Kelley v. CarlsbadIrrigationDist." In this case,
34. See note 18 supra.
35. 74 N.M. 670, 397 P.2d 469 (1964).
36. Id. at 672, 397 P.2d at 470. The court conceded that the non-existence of unappropriated water does not alone defeat an application for a transfer. The court
said:
An examination of § 75-11-3, N.M.S.A. 1953, convinces us that it requires the
state engineer to issue a permit to appropriate from an underground source
if either, (1) there is unappropriated water, or (2) the proposed appropriation will not impair existing rights from such source. (Emphasis added.]
37. Id. at 672, 397 P.2d at 469:
The Wiggins proposal, however, is not one to deliver his private water into
the underground basin to supply appropriations therefrom and to take in exchange an equivalent quantity of water from that basin. . . . [H]e readily
concedes that he has applied for a new appropriation from the underground
basin.
38. 71 N.M. 464, 379 P.2d 763 (1963). Three opinions have been written by the
New Mexico Supreme Court for the Kelley case. The first opinion, supra, was the
landmark decision in which the court held that appeals from the state engineer to a
district court were not to be de novo. See Comment, 3 Natural Resources J. 340 (1963) ;
Clark, J Note of Two Decisions, 1 N.M. Bar Bull. 134 (1963). The second opinion
appeared on December 20, 1965. 4 N.M. Bar Bull. 227 (1965). The second opinion
was withdrawn and replaced by a third opinion on March 10th, 1966. 4 N.M. Bar
Bull. 321 (1966).
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Kelley had filed an application to change his surface point of diversion from the Hondo River to a ground appropriation from the
Roswell Artesian Basin. The application was ultimately denied by
the supreme court "because there can be no change of point of diversion which would permit a transfer of a surface water right to one to
take water from an underground basin."' 3 9 In the 1965 Kelley
opinion the court used the Wiggins steppingstone to reach this decision when it said:
[T] here can be no transfer of a surface right to an underground right
as a matter of law, Reynolds v. Wiggins, 74 N.M. 670, 397 P.2d
469 . . .40
This broad statement was changed in Kelley by a 1966 substituted
opinion rendered upon a motion for rehearing. The substituted
Kelley opinion says:
[T] here can be neither a transfer of a surface right to one in an underground basin nor a change of a point of diversion from the surface appropriation to one from an underground basin. The right to take water
from the underground basin must be initiated by an application for a
new appropriation therefrom. Reynolds v. Wiggins. .

.

. [W]e find

nothing in the language of § 75-11-7, N.M.S.A., 1953 Comp., showing an intent of the legislature to permit a change from surface diversion to a taking by well from an underground basin. Such a transfer
is not authorized as a change of point of diversion. An application for
such 'transfer' could only be considered as an application for a new appropriation from the underground basin as in Reynolds v. Wiggins.
41

4
Although the Templeton case is not expressly overruled in Kelley
or in Wiggins, even the most narrow reading of the preceding quotation leads to the conclusion that the Templeton doctrine has been rejected as contrary to existing law.
The decision of the supreme court to discard the Templeton doctrine and to retain the outdated concept of public water regulation
through the use of two distinct priority systems based on the vague
ground-surface classification of water is unfortunate. Impairment
39. 4 N.M. Bar Bull. 227, 229 (1965) ;4 N.M. Bar Bull. 321, 323 (1966).
40. 4 N.M. Bar Bull. 227, 229 (1965).

41. 4 N.M. Bar Bull. 321, 323 (1966).
42. The supreme court did not mention the Templeton case in the 1965 or 1966
Kelley opinions.
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problems created by transfers must be faced squarely rather than
avoided by eliminating the possibility of transfers. The Kelley decision has abrogated the Templeton doctine, thereby defeating the possibility of having a surface-to-ground transfer of a point of diversion
even when no impairment whatever would result.
If, as the supreme court states in Kelley, there is "nothing . . .
showing an intent of the legislature to permit a change from surface
diversion to a taking by well from an underground basin," 43 then the
legislature should recognize that such transfers are necessary and
possible under certain circumstances and should express such an intent by amending the applicable statute." Creating the possibility
of a Templeton transfer, however remote it may be under the most
stringent rules of impairment, is the least the legislature can do for
New Mexico's surface-right holders. In addition, the legislature
would contribute materially to abandonment of the obsolete method
of classifying New Mexico's public waters as either ground or surface
waters. Taking this vital step is necessary to solve the many problems existing at the present time in the regulation of these waters.
TIMOTHY

W.

GLIDDEN

43. 4 N.M. Bar Bull. 321, 323 (1966).
44. The statutes primarily concerned are N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 75-5-23, -11-7 (1953).

